Policy feedback and the politics of trade agreements
本文运用政策反馈理论，分析为何利益集团会动员起来改变国际制度设计，并以美欧贸易协定中的劳工条款为例，说明早期协定的争议性设计会如何影响后续政治动员。
Why do interest groups mobilise to change the design of international institutions? The existing research on this topic expects moments when there is a peak in political action, but generally does not consider how such peaks might impact future mobilisations. To fill this gap, this article advances an analysis that draws on policy feedback theory. It shows that the greater the preference distances surrounding existing preferential trade agreements (PTA), the more likely it is for political activity to form around prospective trade deals that share certain key commonalities with those more contentious earlier agreements. The article tests the plausibility of that argument in the design of labour provisions in US and EU trade agreements. It shows that, in the US, NAFTA (ratified 1993) introduced a model of labour provisions that was seen over the years as ‘designed to fail’. As a result, it helped mobilise labour unions against prospective PTAs that bore a resemblance to NAFTA. However, the same did not happen in the EU during the 1990s and early 2000s. This article helps connect public policy research with the literature on the politics of trade agreements. It also serves as a cautionary note to policy makers regarding the long-term effects of PTA design on political activity and underscores the need for carefully projecting the political underpinnings of the enforcement of PTA provisions.