Motivating Public Sector Employees: Public Good Contributions in Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority
通过现场实验研究亚的斯亚贝巴水务局员工，发现设定团队共同目标比匿名监督者惩罚更能有效提升个人努力和团队成果，为公共部门克服搭便车问题提供依据。
We present a lab-in-the-field experiment with employees of the Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority to understand how to improve coordination and collaboration in their daily work. Participants play a series of public good games under different rules: a standard game, a game with a threshold, and a game with a randomly selected anonymous monitor who has the power to punish. We show that a common goal, in the form of a threshold to be attained for the group’s success, is significantly more effective than a potentially punishing monitor for increasing individual effort and, ultimately, group outcomes (conditional on the threshold being attained). This result advocates for the introduction of team goals as coordination and motivation devices in settings where tasks are performed by groups and are subject to free riding and coordination challenges.