On the efficiency of insurance institutions under interdependent risks
研究了在损失概率相互依赖的情况下，公共和市场保险机构的均衡与效率，发现两者均无法达到最优效率，且相对效率不确定。
Abstract We theoretically investigate the equilibria and efficiencies of public and market insurance institutions within a framework where loss probabilities are interdependently influenced by the efforts of individuals and institutions (firms). We highlight the multilateral nature of interdependency, which exists within individuals, within firms, and between them. Our analysis reveals that both public and market institutions fall short of achieving first‐best efficiency, and that the relative efficiencies between the two are indeterminate, due to the externalities. Regarding effort levels, we find that under the public institution, individual efforts are lower while institutional efforts are higher compared with the social optimum and the market institution. We also find that individual and/or institutional efforts are lower under the market institution than the social optimum, with both efforts lower under severe externalities.