Meeting Targets in Competitive Product Markets
研究发现公共银行在未达到每股收益目标时股价会下跌，银行通过降低存款利率来达标，但导致存款外流和特许权价值损失，而竞争对手则提高利率吸引储户，表明业绩目标会影响产品价格且竞争可制约目标行为。
ABSTRACT We show that public banks face negative stock return jumps after missing their earnings per share (EPS) targets, and theoretically and quantitatively link these jumps to bunching behavior in the EPS surprise distribution. Bunching banks cut deposit rates to meet their targets, but do so at the expense of deposit outflows and franchise value losses. Local competitors, including private banks unexposed to capital market pressure, increase deposit rates, compensating depositors for switching. Our results provide new evidence that performance targeting incentives can affect consumer product prices, and suggest that competition may provide a check on public firms' targeting efforts.