当个人政治变为公共事务:公务员保护制度是否使政府工作人员免受政治干预?

When Individual Politics Become Public: Do Civil Service Protections Insulate Government Workers?

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2024
被引 1
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

研究威斯康星州州长罢免请愿后,公务员制度是否保护了州官僚免受政治报复,发现受覆盖的公务员薪资未受影响,而未受覆盖的签署者薪资下降约3%。

Abstract

This paper examines whether the civil service system protected state bureaucrats from political interference following a recall petition against the governor of Wisconsin. I find that most classified workers, who were covered by the state civil service laws, were paid equally by signing status following the public disclosure of the petition list. Conversely, signers in the unclassified service, a smaller set of government positions, were paid about 3 percent less annually relative to nonsigners in the postdisclosure period. These results indicate that the civil service insulated qualified bureaucrats, while uncovered workers faced retribution.

公务员制度政治干预政府雇员威斯康星州召回请愿