Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections
通过随机实验发现，提前两年公开市政议员的表现报告卡，能促使高贫民窟地区的议员增加亲贫支出，且无法连任的议员若报告卡显示亲贫记录好则更可能转战他区，但未公开的信息则无此效果。
Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a preelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors’ high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed.