Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act
研究美国《彭德尔顿法案》强制部分海关雇员参加考试的影响，发现改革提升了员工素质并降低了离职率，但未显著改善税收效率，原因在于改革未覆盖所有岗位且未改变高层任命方式。
We use newly digitized data to study the impacts of a historical reform that mandated exams for some employees in the largest US customs-collection districts. Although the reform improved targeted employees’ professional backgrounds and reduced turnover, it did not lead to significant improvements in the cost-effectiveness of customs revenue collection. The incomplete reach of the reform was key for this partial success. First, the reform incentivized hiring in exam-exempted positions, distorting districts’ hierarchical structure. Second, since we find suggestive evidence that districts’ top managers mattered for performance, not changing their appointment method might have constituted a missed opportunity for improvement.