Organized Crime and Economic Growth: Evidence from Municipalities Infiltrated by the Mafia
研究意大利解散被黑手党渗透的市议会如何影响长期经济，发现此举通过削弱黑手党并增强对地方机构的信任，显著提升了就业、企业数量和工业地产价格。
This paper studies the long-run economic impact of dismissing city councils infiltrated by organized crime. Applying a matched difference-in-differences design to the universe of Italian social security records, we find that city council dismissals (CCDs) increase employment, the number of firms, and industrial real estate prices. The effects are concentrated in Mafia-dominated sectors and in municipalities where fewer incumbents are reelected. The dismissals generate large economic returns by weakening the Mafia and fostering trust in local institutions. The analysis suggests that CCDs represent an effective intervention for establishing legitimacy and spurring economic activity in areas dominated by organized crime.