Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing
构建了一个动态一般均衡模型，研究银行因信心丧失而遭受挤兑的脆弱性，并分析信贷宽松政策在挤兑危机和基本面危机中的不同效果。
We present a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model of self-fulfilling bank runs, where banks trade capital in competitive and liquid markets but remain vulnerable to runs due to a loss of creditor confidence. We characterize how the vulnerability of an individual bank depends on its leverage position and the economy-wide asset prices. We study the effect of credit easing policies, in the form of asset purchases. When a banking crisis is generated by runs, credit easing can reduce the number of defaulting banks and enhance welfare. When the crisis is driven by fundamentals, credit easing may have adverse consequences.