European banking M&As: The role of financial advisors
研究了欧洲银行在并购中为何聘请外部顾问，以及顾问选择（顶级或低层）的决定因素，发现多数交易由内部管理，且目标方在不匹配收购方顾问决策时无法获益。
Abstract We investigate the puzzle of banks contracting the services of external advisors for deals they can self-manage and the role of financial advisors in mergers and acquisitions among European banking firms. We also study the determinants of the choice by bank acquirers and bank targets to either appoint external advisors or manage in-house, as well as between appointing either top or lower tier advisors. Top tier advisors are more likely to be employed in debt financed and cross-border deals. We also find that most European bank mergers are managed in-house, contrary to prior findings reporting mostly externally managed deals attributed to the certification effect. Targets fail to benefit from deals where they do not match acquirer’s decision to appoint external advisors. However, there is an overall propensity to match the counter party’s tier of advisor.