Personal connections, financial advisors and M&A outcomes
研究发现，竞标公司高管与财务顾问之间的个人关系（如曾共事、校友或俱乐部成员）会导致竞标方公告回报降低1.7%，但交易更易完成且耗时更长，同时CEO和顾问获得更高报酬。
Abstract Personal connections (based on prior employment, educational, or social club membership overlaps) between top executives and board members of the bidding firm and those of the bidder financial advisor affect Mergers and Acquisition (M&A) outcomes. M&A deals where bidder top managers share past personal work‐related connections with their advisors are associated with 1.7% lower bidder announcement returns compared to the returns for deals without such connections. We also show M&A deals advised by personally connected financial advisors are more likely to be completed but take longer to get finalized. Last, when connections exist, the bidder CEO receives a higher cash bonus upon completion of the deal, and the financial advisors are rewarded by higher advisor fees. Overall, our findings suggest that personal connections between bidders and their financial advisors could be detrimental.