Asymmetric Reciprocity and the Cyclical Behavior of Wages, Effort, and Job Creation
构建了一个搜索匹配模型，其中工人具有非对称参照依赖的互惠偏好，企业考虑工资对工人努力和产出的影响。研究发现努力对工资变化的周期反应会放大冲击，而企业对现有岗位工资刚性下行的预期增加了就业创造的波动性。
This paper develops a search and matching framework in which workers are characterized by asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity and firms set wages by considering the effect that these can have on workers’ effort and, therefore, on output. The cyclical response of effort to wage changes can considerably amplify shocks, independently of the cyclicality of the hiring wage, which becomes irrelevant for unemployment volatility, and firms’ expectations of downward wage rigidity in existing jobs increases the volatility of job creation. The model is consistent with evidence on hiring and incumbents’ wage cyclicality, and provides novel predictions on the dynamics of effort.