Earnings myopia and private equity takeovers
研究发现，公开市场中的盈利短视现象会增加企业被私募股权收购的可能性，且收购后研发投资和生产率得到改善，揭示了私募股权在缓解盈利短视中的作用。
Abstract We examine the role of private equity in alleviating earnings myopia induced by public markets. We first construct a measure of earnings myopia and show that this measure varies as predicted with determinants and effects of myopia. Then we show that public firms exhibiting earnings myopia realize an increased likelihood of takeover by private equity buyers. Cross-sectional analyses indicate that this relation is strongest when costs of earnings myopia are likely higher. Following private equity takeovers, firms exhibiting greater measures of earnings myopia realize improvements to R&D investment and productivity. The results add to the understanding of the role of private equity in identifying and alleviating earnings myopia within U.S. capital markets. This is important given the increasing size of private equity assets under management. Takeover premiums paid for myopic firms suggest a cost of earnings myopia at approximately 6.9% of firm value.