Medical bill shock and imperfect moral hazard
研究发现消费者在医疗服务后因账单信息延迟而扭曲道德风险，账单到达后家庭支出下降11%，纠正价格认知可年均减少16%的医疗支出。
Consumers are sensitive to medical prices when consuming care, but delays in price information may distort moral hazard. We study how medical bills affect household spillover spending following utilization of shoppable services, leveraging variation in insurer claim processing times. Households increase spending by 22% after a scheduled service, but then reduce spending by 11% after the bill arrives. Observed bill effects are consistent with resolving price uncertainty; bill effects are strongest when pricing information is particularly salient. A model of demand for healthcare with delayed pricing information suggests households misperceive pricing signals prior to bills, and that correcting these perceptions reduce average (median) spending by 16% (7%) annually.