Asymmetric auctions: Perturbations, ε- equilibrium, and equilibrium
研究了估值分布和支持区间均不对称的一级价格密封拍卖，通过扰动方法证明了均衡存在性，并刻画了贝叶斯纳什均衡与ε-均衡的关系。
We consider first-price auctions with independent and private valuations that have asymmetric valuation distributions and supports. We first show the existence of equilibrium in these auctions through a perturbation approach, thereby establishing that the limit of Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) of such perturbed auctions is indeed the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the limit auction with asymmetric supports. We then characterize this BNE and show that the ε-equilibrium (ε-BNE) of the auction with asymmetric supports is a BNE of “close” auctions with common supports. We then demonstrate some numerical examples.