Executive compensation: The trend toward one-size-fits-all
研究了2006年以来CEO薪酬结构趋同的一刀切趋势，发现这种标准化可能损害最优激励并降低股东价值，机构投资者、代理顾问和扩大披露是主要驱动因素。
I report and analyze a recent “one-size-fits-all” trend in the structure of executive compensation plans. Since 2006, 24% of the variation in the distribution of CEO compensation across pay components — salary, bonus, stock awards, options, non-equity incentives, pensions, and perquisites — disappeared. This uniformity might come at the expense of optimal incentives, as increases in pay structure similarity translate into lower shareholder value. Using panel data regressions and plausibly exogenous shocks, I find that institutional investors’ influence, proxy advisors’ recommendations, and expanded compensation disclosure are salient drivers of this standardization. The findings highlight an unintended consequence of recent regulations enhancing shareholders’ participation and expanding compensation disclosure.