The effect of securities litigation risk on firm value and disclosure
利用高盛最高法院案件的关键事件，研究发现证券集体诉讼能提升股东价值，尤其在机构持股低时更显著；同时诉讼风险使公司风险披露更短、更少模仿同行、措辞更不确定。
Abstract Critics assert that securities class actions are economically burdensome and yield minimal recoveries, whereas proponents claim they deter wrongdoing. We examine key events in the recent Goldman Sachs Supreme Court case to test the net effect of securities litigation risk on shareholder value. We find that investors view securities class actions as value‐increasing. However, the strength of this effect varies based on external monitoring. Investors view securities class actions as more value‐enhancing when institutional ownership is low. We also use this setting to examine the effect of securities litigation risk on mandatory disclosure because the Goldman Sachs case focuses on mandatory disclosure properties. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find firm risk factor disclosures become shorter and less similar to industry peers, and they contain more uncertain and weak terms. Overall, our results show nuanced effects of securities litigation risk on shareholder value and firm disclosure.