Shaming, stringency, and shirking: Evidence from food‐safety inspections
研究了鸡肉生产商对沙门氏菌质量信息公开展示的反应，发现公开披露能减少偷懒，但门槛过高时仍会引发偷懒，建议采用连续信息披露或对最差质量者罚款。
Abstract This paper examines the responses of chicken producers to public disclosure of quality information (or categorization) regarding Salmonella in chicken carcasses. Producers exert effort to attain better categorization and shirk when failing to meet the thresholds required for better categorization. Public disclosure reduces this shirking effect. However, some producers shirk even under public disclosure when the threshold for disclosure is too stringent. The results suggest that the most effective quality disclosure policies would either disclose continuous (noncategorical) information or impose fines or other sanctions on producers attaining the poorest quality.