Strategic ignorance and procedural fairness preferences
提出程序公平偏好可能解释战略无知现象，即人们为避免良心不安而主动回避了解自己行为对他人造成的伤害，并分析了这种偏好如何导致信息回避行为。
This paper shows that procedural fairness concerns might be a possible explanation for strategic ignorance, that is, that some people avoid information on how their behavior might hurt others. Decision makers with procedural fairness preferences suffer disutility from inequality in ex-ante expected payoffs. Such preferences lead to strategic ignorance if decision makers are in some sense focused on extremes: they generally dislike inequality in expected payoffs, but care little about changes in intermediate inequality. Importantly, this property does not imply a particular curvature of the loss function measuring the suffering from inequality. The theoretical possibility result suggests that more empirical research on strategic ignorance might be warranted. • Some people want to behave selfishly without bad conscience. • They thus avoid information on how their behavior might hurt others. • Procedural fairness concerns can explain such strategic ignorance.