Strategic Stake Acquisitions in Rival Firms: Common vs. Cross‐Ownership
研究了控股股东在竞争对手公司中获取少数股权的两种方式：直接持股（共同所有权）和通过所控公司间接持股（交叉所有权），分析两者在竞争内部化与治理风险上的权衡，并刻画最优模式取决于市场竞争和公司治理强度。
ABSTRACT We study how a blockholder who controls a firm should acquire a minority stake in a rival: directly, creating common ownership , or indirectly through the controlled firm, creating cross‐ownership . Common ownership generates stronger internalization of competitive externalities and allows the blockholder to capture the resulting gains without sharing them with dispersed shareholders. However, it may also create conflicts of interest with minority shareholders that can lead to a loss of control. Cross‐ownership avoids this governance risk but internalizes competition less effectively. We characterize how the optimal acquisition mode depends on the nature of product market competition and the strength of corporate governance.