The effects of fuel subsidies on regional income distribution through smuggling
研究了伊朗燃料补贴导致的走私活动如何影响各省收入分配，发现走私占燃料消费的25%，为贫困边境省份带来可观收入。
Abstract Fuel subsidies, intended to improve consumer affordability, can result in economic distortions through altered relative prices and negative environmental impacts. Furthermore, these subsidies can lead to unintended consequences, such as fuel smuggling, especially to neighboring countries where significant price differences exist. While previous research has extensively explored the economic dimensions of fuel subsidies, the potential interplay between fuel smuggling and its impact on regional income distribution remains understudied. This study investigates the effects of fuel smuggling, stemming from Iran's long history of significant fuel subsidies, on income distribution across all 30 provinces of the country. We employ a model to specify the demand for fuel smuggling, using fuel prices in neighboring countries and the distance to the nearest border as sources of identification. Subsequently, we estimate the monthly smuggling profit across regions and assess this profit's influence on regional income distribution. Our empirical analysis draws on monthly data on gasoline and diesel sales from 160 fuel distribution districts in Iran, spanning the period from 2005 to 2014. Our findings demonstrate specific cases of smuggling activities that account for an average of 25% of total fuel consumption and generate substantial income in economically disadvantaged border provinces. We discuss the socioeconomic implications of fuel subsidies, with a focus on smuggling activities.