Sophisticated reasoning, learning, and equilibrium in repeated games with imperfect feedback
研究了不完全反馈下无限重复博弈中，策略复杂的理性玩家如何通过信念更新和学习，最终收敛到自我确认均衡的序列。
Abstract We analyze the infinite repetition with imperfect feedback of a simultaneous or sequential game, assuming that players are strategically sophisticated—but impatient—expected-utility maximizers. Sophisticated strategic reasoning in the repeated game is combined with belief updating to provide a foundation for a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium. In particular, we model strategic sophistication as rationality and common strong belief in rationality . Then, we combine belief updating and sophisticated reasoning to provide sufficient conditions for a kind of learning—that is, the ability, in the limit, to exactly forecast the sequence of future observations—thus showing that impatient agents end up playing a sequence of self-confirming equilibria in strongly rationalizable conjectures of the one-period game.