Audit and Remediation Strategies in the Presence of Evasion Capabilities
研究当企业能规避审计时，监管方如何设计最优审计与惩罚政策，发现随机审计与递增罚款交替使用更有效，仅在规避无效或自我纠正成本过高时确定性审计才最优。
When companies or organizations can evade audits on their harmful incidents, how should the affected entities design their audit and penalty policies? In “Audit and Remediation Strategies in the Presence of Evasion Capabilities” by Wang, de Véricourt, and Sun, the authors find random audits may be needed in the optimal policy. Specifically, the optimal policy alternates between ascending monetary penalties (without any audits) and random audits at a constant rate (when the penalty reach its maximum level). Only when the evasion is ineffective or the self-correction is too costly do deterministic audits become optimal. They tackle the problem in a continuous-time principal-agent framework with both adverse selection and moral hazard.