Just Friends? Managers’ Connections to Judges
研究发现，法官与企业高管之间的社会关系会显著影响证券集体诉讼的结果，有关系的案件更可能被驳回、更快结案且赔偿金额更低，表明社会关系损害了法官的中立性。
ABSTRACT We study the impact of social connections between judges and executives on the outcomes of Securities Class Action Litigation (SCAL). Judges who are socially connected to a firm's executives are significantly more likely to dismiss lawsuits against the firm. There is also evidence of faster resolution and lower payout amounts in connected cases. The favorable outcomes cannot be explained by the lower severity of connected cases, or by court, judge, or firm characteristics. Our results are more pronounced when executives connected to the judge are named defendants in the lawsuits, when connected cases involve less visible lawsuits or firms, and when connections between judges and executives are likely more direct. Our evidence indicates that social connections influence judge impartiality and meaningfully alter SCAL outcomes.