The Cost of Favoritism in Public Procurement
利用捷克企业代表政治关联的详细数据，研究发现偏袒政治关联企业使采购合同价格比预估成本高出6%，且质量无提升，但欧盟共同资助带来的上级监督可缓解此效应。
Are political connections in public procurement harmful or efficiency gaining for the public sector, and what are the costs of favoritism toward politically connected firms? Exploiting detailed data on firm representatives’ political affiliations in the Czech Republic, we find that favoritism toward politically connected firms increases the price of procurement contracts by 6 percent of the estimated costs, while no gains in terms of quality are generated. Interestingly, these adverse effects of political connections are mitigated by additional oversight from a higher level of the government because they are cofunded by the European Union. On the basis of our estimates, total procurement expenditures increased by .36 percent owing to favoritism.