Control of subsidiary HRM Policies by Multi-national Corporate Headquarters: The Role of Institutional Differences and Labor Unions
研究了跨国企业总部如何控制子公司的人力资源管理政策，发现母国与东道国的就业保护制度差异会增强总部控制，且子公司工会影响力会放大这一效应。
There is a lack of clarity about the institutional sources of variation in the control of multi-national enterprise (MNE) subsidiaries by corporate headquarters (CHQ). Applying comparative institutional theory, we focus on the control of HRM policies by CHQ. First, we argue that when there are substantial home-host institutional differences in national employment protection regulation the dissimilarity in CHQ-subsidiary mindsets increases the likelihood of CHQ control. Second, we argue that union influence within the subsidiary amplifies that effect. We analyze a sample of 708 MNE subsidiaries in 32 countries with CHQs distributed across 39 countries. Unlike some prior work on subsidiary autonomy, we account for the multi-level nature of country and firm-level data. The evidence for the first of our arguments is mixed. However, in that we find a significant three-way interaction effect of CHQ control on home country and host country employment protection regulation and union influence, the second argument finds support. • Investigates the control of HRM policies by corporate headquarters (CHQ). • Uses multilevel methods and a large dataset of MNE subsidiaries. • Effects of home and host country institutions are significant only for higher labor union influence. • Emphasises the role of labor unions in policing national institutional constraints on HRM. • Global market scope of subsidiary also predicts CHQ control of Subsidiary HRM.