Graph Model for Conflict Resolution With Internal Consensus Reaching and External Game
针对冲突方内部存在偏好分歧且外部存在博弈的双重冲突问题，提出一种改进图模型，通过最小化偏好信息损失的共识模型整合内部意见，并引入“博弈共识”概念处理外部冲突，在双渠道供应链价格冲突案例中验证了有效性。
The graph model is devoted to game conflicts arising from incongruent pursued objectives among conflicting parties. Considering that each conflicting party is composed of multiple individuals, preference conflicts stemming from differing cognitive levels and knowledge backgrounds exist among internal individuals. This scenario simultaneously involving game conflicts and preference conflicts is termed dual conflict decision-making problem. Tailored to effectively address this problem, this study proposes an enhanced graph model that incorporates internal consensus and external stability. The best-worst method, incorporating comparative linguistic expressions, is devised to effectively elicit individual preferences over game states. To mitigate preference conflicts inherent to internal individuals within conflicting party concerning game states, a consensus reaching model minimizing preference information loss is introduced. By this way, collective preferences are obtained. Based on these, the concept of “game consensus” is proposed to manage the game conflicts and the diverse behaviors exhibited by conflicting party. Finally, a case study regarding price conflict within a dual-channel supply chain, accompanied by a comparative analysis, is presented to validate the effectiveness of the proposal. Compared to existing graph model, the proposal effectively grapples with consensus issues and heterogeneous behaviors within conflicting parties, making it more valuable in practice.