Employment restrictions on resource transferability and value appropriation from employees
研究了企业采用四种雇佣限制（保密、不招揽、不招聘、竞业禁止）的联合模式，发现同时采用四种限制的员工收入比仅签保密协议的低5.4%，且该效应由低议价能力员工驱动。
Abstract Research Summary We examine the joint adoption of four employment restrictions that limit firm resource outflows—nondisclosure (NDA), non‐solicitation, non‐recruitment, and noncompete agreements—and their associations with value appropriation from employees. Using novel individual‐ and firm‐level survey data, we find that when firms adopt restrictions, they tend to adopt either all four restrictions or only an NDA. Adoption of all four restrictions is more likely when workers have access to valuable resources, noncompetes are more enforceable, and states adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Employees with all four restrictions earn 5.4% less than employees with only NDAs, and this effect is driven by workers with low bargaining power. Analyses of earnings and a single restriction (e.g., only noncompetes) yield opposite results from those considering joint adoption, likely because of selection. Managerial Summary Valuable firm resources are often embedded in employees. We study whether and when firms adopt four employment restrictions that could protect such resources—agreements not to disclose information, not to solicit clients or coworkers, and not to join or start a competitor—and examine the extent to which they are associated with value capture from employees. Using novel firm and worker‐level surveys, we find that firms mostly adopt either all four restrictions together, only an NDA, or use no restrictions. Workers are more likely to have all four restrictions when they have access to valuable resources, when noncompetes are more enforceable, and when states adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Finally, all four restrictions are associated with 5.4% lower earnings on average relative to workers with only an NDA, driven by workers with low‐bargaining power.