Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems
研究了Myerson(1982)广义委托代理模型中多个委托人交互的情形，证明在委托人各自向代理人提出机制的企业博弈中，完美贝叶斯均衡结果与Myerson定义的委托人均衡等价，并建立了若干版本的显示原理。
Myerson (1982) formalizes general principal–agent problems, in which agents have private information and choose actions. His contribution is best known for a version of the revelation principle in the case of a single principal but he also introduces a model of interacting principals. We push the latter forward by studying the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of the corporations’ game in which every principal proposes a mechanism to his agents. We show that several versions of the revelation principle hold in our framework and that, under certain conditions, every principals’ equilibrium, as defined in Myerson (1982), is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the corporations’ game.