Family firms and the governance of global value chains
研究了家族企业作为主导跨国企业或合作伙伴时，如何影响全球价值链中的选址、内部化程度和关系管理，为理解控制与信任动态提供了更全面的框架。
Abstract The current evolution of global value chains (GVCs) calls for moving beyond the “unipolar” view of lead multinational enterprises (MNEs) as sole rulers to examine how their characteristics and those of partner firms affect GVC governance. In response to this call, we focus on family firms, which are the most ubiquitous organizational form worldwide and represent the majority of firms participating in GVCs. Unlike non-family firms, these organizations face distinct mixed gambles, driven by both economic and non-economic goals. However, internalization theory and the associated global factory model, which explain GVC governance, rely solely on economic assessments, limiting our understanding and predictability of MNE behavior. Therefore, in this study, we show how location decisions, degree of internalization, and relationship management in GVCs differ from the conventional global factory model when family firms are involved as lead MNEs and/or partners. By analyzing how comparative efficiency considerations change when family firms are involved, we offer implications for internalization theory and provide a more comprehensive framework for understanding control and trust dynamics in GVCs. Thus, we pave the way for future research to revise and enrich international business theories, taking into account the distinctiveness and heterogeneity of family firms.