Incentives and performance under two-dimensional moral hazard
研究了代理人同时选择努力程度和项目类型时，激励强度与预期绩效可能呈负向关系，并给出了条件，说明“一分钱一分货”原则不稳健，为非行为因素导致的激励失效提供解释。
This paper explores how an agent’s incentives map into her performance. We let the agent choose how much effort to invest and which project to implement. We show that the relationship between an agent’s incentives to perform and her expected performance could be negative and we characterize alternative conditions for a negative relationship. This also holds true when the principal instead of the agent makes the project choice. We thereby show that the you-get-what-you-pay-for principle is not robust and offer a non-behavioral explanation for the failure of incentives. The results have implications for regulation and ownership structures.