Optimal decisions and coordination of a supply chain in the hybrid recycling mode with traceability and fairness concern
研究了制造商和零售商在回收竞争下，考虑可追溯性和公平关切时的最优决策与协调问题，发现消费者对可追溯性的偏好有益于环境和企业，而零售商的公平关切会损害系统利润并阻碍可追溯系统发展。
Considering the case of recycling competition between a manufacturer and a retailer, we construct game models under centralised and decentralised decision-making with or without fairness concern, respectively. By comparatively analysing the optimal decisions and profits under the three models, we design an improved two-part tariff contract to realise supply chain coordination. We have the following findings: First, in the supply chain with traceability, consumers’ preference for traceability and the impact of traceability on recycling are not only beneficial to the environment but also to each enterprise. Second, the retailer’s concern for fairness can harm the profits of the manufacturer and system. Moreover, the retailer’s disproportionate focus on fairness of the distribution of revenues hinders the introduction and development of the traceability system, leading to lower recycling volume and demand. Third, the traceability system is most efficient under centralised decision-making, attaining the highest traceability level, recycling volume, and system profit. The retail price and manufacturer’s recycling price are lower than those under decentralised decision-making. Our findings also suggest that improved two-part tariff contract can enhance the chain members’ performance. While fairness concern and fierce recycling competition hinder implementation of the coordination mechanism, and improved traceability facilitates the attainment of coordination.