Chief accountants weigh in: How professional leadership of SOEs influence investment efficiency
研究中国国有企业总会计师（政府官员兼任领导）对投资效率的影响，发现其能提升效率，主要通过降低代理成本、改善信息环境等机制，对股东压力大的企业效果更明显。
This study examines the impact of the Chief Accountant (CA), government official holding a leadership position in selected State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), on investment efficiency. Our study employs the staggered implementation of CA positions as a quasi-natural experimental framework to conduct a difference-in-differences analysis. Using a unique dataset from China, our research reveals a positive correlation between the presence of CA and corporate investment efficiency. Our channel analysis indicates that the involvement of CA is associated with agency costs, information environment, internal controls, and cash flow levels. In heterogeneous tests, we observe a more pronounced positive influence of CA on investment efficiency in firms with changing controlling shareholders and firms with higher ownership stakes. In cross-sectional analyses, the CA's positive influence on investment efficiency is more significant in firms experiencing substantial shareholder pressure, compared to those with less. Our empirical findings are robust and withstand various sensitivity tests. This study provides empirical evidence supporting the role of CA in enhancing corporate governance and optimizing investment decision-making.