Sequentially Stable Outcomes
在扩展式博弈中引入并分析序贯稳定结果，证明其存在性、与序贯均衡的关系，以及满足前向归纳等选择标准，对博弈论学者判断是否阅读原文有参考价值。
This paper introduces and analyzes sequentially stable outcomes in extensive‐form games. An outcome ω is sequentially stable if, for any ε > 0 and any small enough perturbation of the players' behavior, there is an ε ‐perturbation of the players' payoffs and a corresponding equilibrium with outcome close to ω . Sequentially stable outcomes exist for all finite games and are outcomes of sequential equilibria. They are closely related to stable sets of equilibria and satisfy versions of forward induction, iterated strict equilibrium dominance, and invariance to simultaneous moves. In signaling games, sequentially stable outcomes pass the standard selection criteria, and when payoffs are generic, they coincide with outcomes of stable sets of equilibria.