Efficient incentives with social preferences
研究了在代理人社会偏好和私人收益均存在信息不对称时，如何设计事后预算平衡、贝叶斯激励相容且帕累托有效的机制，发现三人及以上群体可解决任意分配问题。
We explore mechanism design with outcome‐based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi‐linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of at least three agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex post budget‐balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive‐compatible, interim individually rational, and ex post Pareto‐efficient.