More Incentive, Less Pollution: Environmental Responsibility of Local Cadres and Environment Governance
利用中国政府环境审计的准自然实验，发现强化地方干部环境责任后，试点城市环保支出增加、空气污染减少，且企业环保投资和绿色专利增多，对研究官员激励与环境治理关系的学者有参考价值。
SYNOPSIS In this paper, we study how the environmental responsibility of local cadres shapes their environmental governance. Using the staggered implementation of the government environmental audit in China as a quasi-experiment, our difference-in-differences estimation shows that, after strengthening the environmental responsibility of city leaders, pilot cities experience a significant increase in fiscal environmental expenditure and a reduction in air pollution. The effect is more pronounced among cities whose leaders have stronger promotion incentives, but less pronounced among cities with higher economic costs on pollution governance. In addition, firms located in pilot cities exhibit a significant increase in environment-related investments and green patent applications, which is motivated by government-awarded environmental subsidies. Overall, our results shed new light on the role of the environmental responsibility of city leaders in environmental governance and provide policy implications to promote environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practice and sustainable transition in a top-down approach. Data Availability: Data will be made available on request.