Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching
通过三个激励性择校实验，发现当学校录取决策存在相关性时，学生申请策略变得更激进且忽视安全选项，部分原因是相关性忽视，对匹配机制设计有启示。
We present results from three experiments containing incentivized school choice scenarios. In these scenarios, we vary whether schools’ assessments of students are based on a common priority (inducing correlation in admissions decisions) or are based on independent assessments (eliminating correlation in admissions decisions). The quality of students’ application strategies declines in the presence of correlated admissions: application strategies become substantially more aggressive and fail to include attractive “safety” options. We provide a battery of tests suggesting that this phenomenon is at least partially driven by correlation neglect, and we discuss implications for the design and deployment of student-to-school matching mechanisms.