Monopolization with Must-Haves
研究了上游供应商通过“必备品”特性，结合捆绑销售和排他性条款，垄断相邻竞争市场的机制，并指出禁止这些条款的政策可能无效甚至适得其反。
An increasing number of monopolization cases have been constructed around the notion of “must-have” items: products that distributors must carry to “compete effectively.” Motivated by these cases, we consider a multiproduct setting where upstream suppliers sell their products through competing distributors offering one-stop-shopping convenience to consumers. We show the emergence of products that distributors cannot afford not to carry if their rivals do. A supplier of such products can exploit this must-have property, along with tying and exclusivity provisions, to monopolize adjacent, otherwise-competitive markets. Policy interventions that ban tying or exclusivity provisions may prove ineffective or even backfire.