Beliefs, Learning, and Personality in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
通过实验研究无限重复囚徒困境中信念的异质性及其演变，发现信念强烈预测合作行为，且信任型被试通过经验学习合作。
We aim to understand the role and evolution of beliefs in the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (IRPD). To do so, we elicit beliefs about the supergame strategies chosen by others. We find heterogeneity in beliefs and changes in beliefs with experience are central to understanding behavior and learning in the IRPD. Beliefs strongly predict cooperation, beliefs respond to the return to cooperation, most subjects choose strategies that perform well given their beliefs, and beliefs change with experience while becoming more accurate over time. Finally, we uncover a novel mechanism whereby trusting subjects learn to cooperate through their interaction with experience.