Intelligence Disclosure and Cooperation in Repeated Interactions
实验研究在囚徒困境和性别战博弈中，披露玩家智力信息如何影响合作与协调行为，发现高智力者面对低智力对手时信任降低，导致合作减少。
How does information about players’ intelligence affect strategic behavior? Game theory, based on the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, does not provide useful predictions. We experimentally show that, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, disclosure hampers cooperation: higher-intelligence players trust their partners less when playing against someone of lower ability. Similarly, in the Battle of Sexes with low payoff inequality, disclosure disrupts coordination, as higher-intelligence players try to force their most preferred outcome. Instead, with higher payoff inequality, behavior changes and higher-intelligence players concede. We analyze the reasons for these patterns of behavior.