Communicating about Confidence: Cheap Talk with an Ambiguity-Averse Receiver
研究了专家通过廉价谈话向模糊厌恶的决策者传递概率信息的问题，发现模糊厌恶既可能促进也可能阻碍信息传递，取决于信息对决策者是好消息还是坏消息。
An expert, who is only informed of the probability of possible states, communicates with a decision-maker through cheap talk. The decision-maker considers different probability distributions over states as possible and is ambiguity averse. I show that all equilibria of the game are equivalent to partitional ones and that the most informative is interim dominant for the expert. Information transmission regarding probabilities that are bad news for the decision-maker is facilitated by ambiguity aversion. However, ambiguity aversion also makes information transmission impossible, whatever the preference misalignment, regarding probabilities that are good news for him.