Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Implications for Horizontal Mergers
研究了当每家厂商拥有其序列相关边际成本的私人信息时，差异化产品厂商的重复定价行为，发现信号激励可使均衡价格显著高于静态完全信息情形，并用啤酒行业数据解释了2008年MillerCoors合资后的价格水平上升和成本传导变化。
We model repeated pricing by differentiated product firms when each firm has private information about its serially correlated marginal cost. In a fully separating equilibrium of the dynamic game, signaling incentives can lead equilibrium prices to be significantly above those in a static, complete information game, even when the possible variation in the privately observed state variables is very limited. We calibrate our model using data from the beer industry and show that, without any change in conduct, our model can explain increases in price levels and changes in price dynamics and cost pass-through after the 2008 MillerCoors joint venture.