Monitoring Teams
研究委托人如何通过选择监控结构和绩效奖励方案来激励一组代理人工作，发现最优监控团队应同质化且反分类分配，高成本代理人租金更低且被更密切监控。
A principal incentivizes a group of agents to work by choosing a monitoring structure and a scheme of performance-contingent rewards. The monitoring structure partitions the set of agents into monitoring teams, each delivering a signal of joint performance. We show that unlike under partial implementation, the principal always exhausts her monitoring capacity to optimally implement work as a unique outcome. Optimal monitoring teams are homogeneous between them: equally sized and with agents allocated in an anti-assortative fashion. Higher-effort-cost agents receive lower rents, and they tend to be monitored more closely than lower-effort-cost agents when the principal’s allocation is constrained.