Going in Different Directions? The 2023 Elections in Poland and Slovakia and Their Aftermath
研究了2023年波兰和斯洛伐克议会选举如何体现选民对执政党的反应，以及前总理菲佐和图斯克重返权力对民主、欧盟和国际政治的影响。
Elections provide signals. They signal the state of public opinion, the robustness of a democracy and the direction of democratic travel. Poland and Slovakia went to the polls in the autumn of 2023 in parliamentary elections. In both cases, they were change elections marked by the electorate's reaction to the acts and performance of governing parties propelled into power at previous elections in the context of significant social and political disruption caused by the pandemic and Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But they also marked the return to power of prominent politicians whose domestic political careers had appeared to be over. Moreover, responding to the direction of travel their countries had been taking in previous years, the old–new politicians at the helm of their respective countries sought to chart a different course. This change of direction had significant ramifications for the state of democracy, the European Union (EU) and wider international politics. Furthermore, whilst the Slovak case offers additional insights into the causes and course of democratic backsliding that has been a prominent feature of Central European politics in recent times (e.g., Bakker and Sitter, 2022; Bernhard, 2021; Guasti and Bustikova, 2023; Vachudova, 2020), the Polish case provides pointers to the necessary ingredients for democratic resilience. In addition, both cases underscore the arguments about swerves and careening in the processes of democratization or autocratization (Cianetti and Hanley, 2021). Indeed, Poland and Slovakia not only illuminate that the path towards or away from democracy is rarely linear, involving many contingencies along the way, but also illuminate that journeys may involve many changes of direction depending on whose hands are on the steering wheel, particularly when the fate of democracy itself becomes central to political contestation. Three-time Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico had looked a broken man in 2020. In 2018, the murder of a journalist and his fiancée, who had been investigating the murky links between politicians, organized crime and organs of the state, provoked an outcry and large-scale demonstrations. Fico stepped down as premier, although he remained as head of his party, Direction – Social Democracy (Smer – sociálna demokracia, Smer-SD). In the subsequent parliamentary elections in 2020, Fico was swept from power. Thanks in no small part to anti-corruption appeals, Igor Matovič's Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (Obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti, OĽaNO) hoovered up a quarter of the vote and was able to form a four-party coalition with a constitutional majority (Haughton et al., 2022). Moreover, in the aftermath of the election, several of Fico's closest lieutenants broke away to form a new party, Voice – Social Democracy (Hlas – sociálna demokracia, Hlas-SD), luring away many Smer-SD voters. But after a political career that looked to be dying in the spring of 2020, Fico returned to the prime ministerial chair after Smer-SD bounced back to win the most votes in the election 3 years later. In Poland, Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and its leader Jarosław Kaczyński had dominated Polish politics for the 8 years prior to the 2023 elections. PiS and Kaczyński's great rival in Polish politics for much of the 21st century was the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), led by Donald Tusk, who had also become Kaczyński's long-standing nemesis. Tusk, however, left Polish politics in 2014 to become European Council President, appearing to draw a line under his domestic political career. But in a surprising turn of events, he decided to return to Poland and lead PO in the forthcoming elections. In 2023, the party and its coalition allies mustered enough votes to remove PiS from power and ensure a triumphant return for Tusk to the post of prime minister. Both elections, however, were about much more than the striking returns of former prime ministers. Not only did they highlight deep divisions in public opinion and mark the electorate's verdict on the governments formed after the previous elections, but depending on one's political stance, they ushered in a period of reversal, restoration or revenge politics, with profound consequences for democracy in both countries. The elections were also defeats or victories for coalitions. Slovakia's anti-Fico coalition had fractured by 2023, and Poland's anti-PiS coalition managed to put aside differences to work together and mobilize a large turnout of voters. Moreover, the formation of the new governments owed much to the mechanics of the electoral systems. Slovakia's proportional electoral system operates with a 5% threshold for parties and a 7% threshold for coalitions of two or three parties, but the party lists are open, allowing preference votes to be cast for specific candidates. Poland's proportional representation system operates with a 5% threshold for parties and an 8% threshold for coalitions. Junior coalition partners were aided in both cases: in Slovakia, flexible lists helped one of Fico's coalition allies cross the threshold, and in Poland, a crucial campaigning decision to encourage voters to support a smaller electoral bloc helped ensure the anti-PiS forces mustered enough seats to form a new government. This article begins by examining the election outcome in both cases. After exploring the similarities and differences of electoral politics, we examine the domestic implications of the elections, particularly what the new governments' opponents like to label as revenge and what their supporters prefer to label as the politics of restoration. We then examine the EU and wider international implications, particularly regarding the war in Ukraine, before concluding with some wider lessons for democratic backsliding and the resilience of democracy across Europe. Although nominally ideologically different parties (one belonging to the European Conservatives and Reformists and the other a long-time member of the Party of European Socialists, albeit having been suspended in 2006 for 3 years), PiS and Smer-SD entered their respective electoral campaigns not only as central players on their political scenes but also as offering a strikingly similar pitch to the electorate. PiS had emerged at the beginning of the 21st century, quickly becoming the standard bearer of cultural conservatism, standing in opposition to the liberal Civic Platform. In its second spell in government from 2015 onwards, PiS not only pushed its socially conservative agenda, such as restricting women's reproductive rights and articulating an anti-LGBT agenda, but also pursued a strong welfarist agenda, for example, by increasing child benefits (Grzebalska and Pető, 2018). Moreover, under the party's watch, Poland experienced democratic backsliding. Following the ‘Fidesz playbook’, under PiS's rule, Poland saw not only the replacement of judges and the undermining of judicial independence but also a significant slanting of the media landscape and the use of identity politics to label certain sections of society as un-Polish – a set of developments that was important in mobilizing votes for PiS's opponents (Bernhard, 2025; Pirro and Stanley, 2022). PiS's socially conservative, national-oriented and economically somewhat redistributionist policies (with an electorate based in the poorer, rural areas) were strikingly similar to Smer-SD. Smer-SD has been on a long journey since it was founded by Robert Fico in 1999. Originally a challenger party out of the new party handbook offering the a new direction the with and social the party itself as the standard bearer of the to the policies of the government (Haughton and The party's of power its in towards a more conservative cultural after the in 2015 and The and conservative in its politics were after the more broke away from Smer-SD to form and were by the of the party as – sociálna demokracia, both a Slovak of social democracy and an in opposition to PiS and Smer-SD were an of parties that under the of and The that not parties under the of the scenes in both although also a central in and the in both Poland and Slovakia, support for PiS and Smer-SD at of to owed much to the and voters cast their and they turn out at The of the elections are in and The of turnout for the Polish elections was than the the three when only the electorate cast their The turnout to the that was much more of a election, although an important PiS sought to mobilize voters with its of the not only to in of the war but also to crime and PiS saw its vote from 8 to but that PiS many of its votes from of some of that been a of it that PiS managed to its voters after 8 years in and its owed much to the of the party's that the to the of the opposition parties was their to mobilize voters who had not in of who had not years for the The in turnout was not to an although that an important voters in a of in both rural and across the were to turn out to vote for the opposition The of mobilizing voters owed much to the the opposition the the of the PiS government and its with Poland's democratic and media its and stance, with its and helped the opposition the election as the to Poland's of the PiS government was as to lead to the of rights like and Poland out of the Tusk his return to domestic Polish politics as by a to Poland from the fate PiS government the of voters was not to politicians but to of what the PiS government was and to women's rights and Poland's in were mobilizing at the of a of several years that were of a of and (Bernhard, in Slovakia owed much to the Fico the election as a verdict on the parties that had formed the government in 2020. beginning with of the seats in the coalition government led by Igor Matovič's to a no vote in with the by a government the elections. their part in between the coalition but did Matovič's governing and the of politics was out in and were by the by and a after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. his previous in he to significant of and to of with the of the Fico's pitch to the electorate was to and on mobilizing his particularly with of was also a for his coalition partners in But the Smer-SD to the an that some voters and of the Slovak support of Ukraine. In on and at Fico not to to Slovakia's in its war with but to on the This of of the war and a of strong was central to Fico's electoral and Smer-SD a return of Fico to power as an the former prime opponents sought to the election a of Fico and what a new government for Slovakia had out on parliamentary representation in 2020, in the polls and the most leader of an government. leader to the of Fico to power and the set Not only were of a return to for the of Fico and his but were about the of several into the of and politicians to sought to itself as a party with and to on the of The party's in the polls in the before that from a similar to in 2020. In the however, the anti-Fico vote remained This was a of the voters. socially liberal had in the of Slovakia, and of about his But by other politicians, particularly the of a of new parties, also to that party politics was more by and a to be the than to to In both Slovakia and Poland, the of Fico and Tusk to form governments owed much to the electoral of their coalition partners and the of the electoral systems. In Poland, the government formed was a coalition of a strong to the of Slovakia's coalition of coalitions that the government of in PO forces with an of smaller and the party in the Civic Obywatelska, of parties together in The But it was the The that was in the the of was Poland as a social in the and of Poland's and one of Poland's parties, the Polish Party was at the head of a coalition that in some the government formed after the election was a coalition of coalitions of coalitions. the sought to an path to the two parties that had dominated Polish politics in the 21st century, although at the of its pitch was a social more conservative than PO and more than The of owed much not only to its but also to a campaigning by Tusk and his The of Polish politics PiS voters who had or the Kaczyński were to to support the Civic with Tusk to a of social benefits by the PiS such as for and in the public and EU to democratic that be necessary for majority Tusk some voters to cast their for to ensure it cross the electoral had been some prior to the election of a of the coalition but Tusk and his allies for albeit a strong signal they form a coalition government they a of seats in The mechanics of the electoral system also a in Fico's return to power. Slovakia operates with voters able to cast preference votes for up to and 2018). who the of more than of voters for that electoral up the than of (one of the owed their election to preference lists provide the for party to their support to to and The most striking of preference was the Slovak Party Although one of the parties of Slovak politics, it had the electoral threshold in and of back in subsequent But the party offering to former of parties and many of had prominent in the The electoral the threshold with of the but of the new only the party leader was a member of the its to a government with and a coalition had been the the of the coalition government in Poland was the were the was not of on the decision of former Prime Minister and his party, had broken away from Smer-SD after the had sought to as a social democratic party, to and politicians that they were from Smer-SD and Slovakia to be part of the European decision was to be to the of majority government. In the after the election, political and media were with and of and offers from both Fico and it that and his party return to the at in of coalition by a of the Fico had some to and than of politicians when they were in or that a government be a more and to form a coalition with Smer-SD and Both the and governments quickly on what be as a of some of their but what supporters label and opponents politics. in the election the new appeared to be on judicial politics and The and several investigating of involving Fico and his were from by the replacement of the head of the a later. Moreover, much parliamentary was up to the involving a of for of and and a of the of Furthermore, the of to and by a former and of was the direction of travel in Slovakia was away from democratic in Poland, the – and the the ideologically coalition of coalitions together – was to democracy and the 8 years of backsliding under PiS But that profound the by be a government to democratic backsliding to some of the their opponents in an the new for the and of the state media and Polish the for the and a of the judges had been since PiS had it Indeed, both Poland and Slovakia highlight for opponents of backsliding and its return or the and of the and – a that is when the the judicial system and their democratic opponents to Moreover, when use to in and they up political for when they elections. a their at democratic to be by the previous or for the of the to undermining their democratic cast enough on the to the of then they may it to return to and their as the restoration of the of both new governments' changes provoked domestic In Poland, PiS politicians and supporters and Kaczyński Tusk a and to In Slovakia, with strong of the reaction to the Fico was in the of the new government were with a of large-scale across the But they also provoked from EU Justice a in the not to the and a the Fico was by the European Fico and his allies for the and the of EU at the of opposition politicians from Slovakia who were of developments in the of in EU Although the of in Poland and Slovakia they or a for change et al., In the case of Poland, not only are the particularly the majority to a but also the into Both Polish and his in Slovakia, were political opponents of Tusk and had been PiS's in two elections, and had been a member of although both had their party when they head of Both the leader of the party that had the of seats to form a in Poland's case that the that PiS not be able to a majority in the formation of the government was by a a in the Fico had an Fico to to form a as a government looked but not certain in the aftermath of the In both Poland and Slovakia, the a in or the of the new government. Not only in a of did two PiS politicians of of power in the when the had to their to but he also sought to the social of the new government by a the use of the after The for a majority in to a that had at his a to the new government the of his in In Slovakia, the government for several of its and for in to their Moreover, by the changes to the to the in only the for the In the second in Fico's his in the second the former and by the to be a not only to Slovakia's direction of travel but also to remove an with the to into the developments in Slovakia and Poland underscore the and of democratic backsliding and its reversal, by and The new Fico decision to on the and had of the was increasing the independence of to many of politicians and of the government The new Fico of investigating and the of the helped and out a strong signal about the of what the new government was to Moreover, the the to a than of and the decision of the Slovak to the and the new were then with of and of The were also more at the after the in the in Slovakia's turn as a new the state a governing by government This new with of on on and in to to or turn down the of in the is striking in the Polish case is that the to the of the previous 8 years not involve a in the of In the in direction are much the a on the judicial and the media and and divisions in both the it be a was on on a of and a on that in the parliamentary The of owed to the of the but social in the coalition also had one on and European elections. In Slovakia, the on Fico in the of allies of Fico of at opposition politicians and the liberal media for a opposition the be to an of democratic and The war in cast a long European politics in deep divisions in domestic politics, to to was Polish parties that the to on the of and the by in and with European politicians, his election that the of for support for the EU was in the European In the election of the Smer-SD government in Slovakia a of the support for Ukraine. Slovakia had long on with by and had been more back as Fico had in his election campaigns and his that be to of the not the et al., a he in the 2023 But whilst in such be as a for an Slovakia, in 2023, it towards Russia's in the in the and of the new Fico government out signals. the one Fico to use his campaigning line about not a to but only offering to the consequences of the Moreover, he of the for to up in to the and the new was hands with his at an international But with a to of had links to in to to to and a of the Slovak and governments in the Slovak of in at were Moreover, strong about the war on the of European Council Fico to along with the albeit with Slovakia taking a The that under Slovakia had become an and in the of EU and be by a a to a strong signal to a domestic whilst not to be such a on the European The for Slovakia's under however, is also to of and a like Fico to the course of its two of EU Slovakia has to EU policies in the of and policies et al., but as a Slovakia has no to EU and may and but they are in Slovakia's the to Fico's The on and support for benefits for the Slovak and the of to the prime minister. Fico's of his to as the of the only to the of The new Slovak government did not in the war in were also the domestic a new in the with Fico similar of to and Poland under PiS the of and an vote in the European out of of the European the the changes to the however, appeared to no on the and direction of travel of Slovakia's new government. In the new Polish government was with a of in both its domestic and the in EU more in of Poland's forthcoming of the Council for the of Slovakia was beginning to former European Council Tusk was back to as a to the of in The new Polish prime was able to quickly on a to EU an as an for his Moreover, the from the to on the of as as of with the disruption of the of was in European and The Polish was not the only also swept the with changes also the Polish representation to the with former in the European put in Moreover, who returned as was to his to This however, was by the of to in the case of Poland was its from in his as European Council his previous government had been as a in and the new Poland also its coalition had been the PiS government. Poland under Tusk not be an member Indeed, in such as or the and it is to the majority of the other member Following the by Polish on both the and the of with Ukraine, for example, Tusk was to that Poland be from some of the The election of the new governments had consequences for both and the of the was of Poland's return to the European it did not the for the a for the new Polish government to with and both of under PiS's The of and before important has been one of the of the that looked set to return under a after in Tusk for an an of the Moreover, whilst Poland and they were on an to the one with in that the has to return to its state we are a part of the But whilst were and when Tusk and some and the of about the and the at the of a in in the deep divisions between the and on the one and and Slovakia on the Although Poland and Slovakia had in some was the of what had been the In spring one of the most remained to with both and Slovakia to support the of the and the may become an for Tusk it is as additional to After Tusk at the that like rights and the of were when was In both Poland and Slovakia in 2023 voters a for for and for reversal, although some politicians as a for But the also for in the of parties and electoral politics. provoked and the of The and a subsequent in PiS's a of about the of the electoral of led to appearing to in of candidates. In Poland, particularly between the social and social in the to the not only that are both and forces that the but also that democratic backsliding and conservative are not two of the Slovakia's elections in that the course of Slovak politics was set for the But to the up the of and the the change of direction after the elections, path is by government and opposition politicians and the of the wider electorate in the and years the of and But the of the of the new governments that it is to liberal democracy than and different and in different the election in both countries the across of party systems. and party are of the electorate of parties such as PiS and but that into an to form governments on the of smaller and political in coalition Poland and Slovakia highlight three wider lessons for the of democratic backsliding and resilience. electoral turnout The Polish case both the of society in mobilizing the electorate before and election campaigns and the of and in more rural out to the of and were necessary in the of a coalition that 8 years of PiS and Poland's and democratic The up in Poland in 2023 – and the of turnout – a strong to the coalition of coalitions in Slovakia in Moreover, the the changes become or to Poland and Slovakia illuminate the by to direction along the The two cases that judicial and changes to the media landscape are of liberal democracy, developments in Slovakia quickly in an Poland the direction of travel be albeit in that about the and to the Democracy as the Slovak put We are to Bernhard, and the of the for