Optimal redistributive charity
在Mirrleesian框架下分析最优再分配性慈善捐赠，发现地位动机、接受捐赠的污名和交易成本会降低最优边际补贴，甚至可能使慈善应被征税而非补贴。
Abstract This paper analyzes optimal redistributive charitable giving in a Mirrleesian framework. The status motive behind charity, the stigma from receiving donations, and transaction costs all work to decrease the optimal marginal subsidies on redistributive charity. Because the existing empirical evidence of these effects (when available) is highly uncertain and context‐dependent, the range of possible outcomes is large, and even includes the possibility that charitable giving should be taxed rather than subsidized. In a natural benchmark case, the optimal tax treatment of charitable giving is consistent with a simple tax credit, whereas pure tax deductions are never part of the optimal policy.