数据、竞争与数字平台

Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms

American Economic Review · 2024
被引 43
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

研究垄断平台如何利用数据匹配消费者与多产品卖家,通过定向广告和信息揭示实现收益最大化,并分析隐私保护规则对消费者福利的影响。

Abstract

A monopolist platform uses data to match heterogeneous consumers with multiproduct sellers. The consumers can purchase the products on the platform or search off the platform. The platform sells targeted ads to sellers that recommend their products to consumers and reveals information to consumers about their match values. The revenue-optimal mechanism is a managed advertising campaign that matches products and preferences efficiently. In equilibrium, sellers offer higher qualities at lower unit prices on than off platform. The platform exploits its information advantage to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis the sellers. Finally, privacy-respecting data-governance rules can lead to welfare gains for consumers.

数字平台数据匹配定向广告隐私规制