Cross-border regulatory cooperation and cash holdings: Evidence from US-listed foreign firms
研究了跨境监管合作（多边谅解备忘录）如何通过增强美国证监会的执法威胁，促使在美国上市的外国公司减少现金持有，尤其在公司治理较弱的国家效果更明显。
We investigate the effect of cross-border regulatory cooperation on the cash holdings of firms cross-listed on US stock exchanges. The staggered adoption of the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU) facilitates cooperation among securities regulators around the world and expands their enforcement capabilities against foreign firms. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that US-listed foreign firms significantly reduce their cash holdings after their home countries sign the MMoU, suggesting that the threat of increased SEC enforcement induced by regulatory cooperation disciplines corporate insiders from stockpiling cash holdings to enjoy private benefits of control. Information opacity and the cost of capital are two of the channels through which the threat of increased SEC enforcement affects cash holdings. The reduction in cash holdings is more pronounced for foreign firms from countries with weaker governance. After the MMoU, foreign firms make faster cash adjustments toward target levels, they reduce cash by making payouts, and their cash is valued more by investors.