Optimal Internality Taxation of Product Attributes
研究当消费者存在行为偏差时，仁慈的政策制定者应如何对产品属性进行最优征税或补贴，利用市场选择信息设计非线性税收，并论证行为驱动的产品标准合理性。
This paper explores how a benevolent policymaker should optimally tax (or subsidize) product attributes when consumers are behaviorally biased. We demonstrate that market choices are informative about biases, which can be exploited for targeting biased consumers via a nonlinear tax schedule. We show that the properties of this schedule depend on few parameters of the joint distribution of consumer valuations and biases. Furthermore, we provide a novel justification for behaviorally motivated product standards and derive when a combination of taxes and standards is optimal. We illustrate our findings based on a numerical example from the lightbulb market.