Disclosing and cooling-off: An analysis of insider trading rules
分析了美国证券交易委员会的两项内幕交易新规：强制披露和冷却期，发现披露可能降低所有投资者福利，冷却期则对投机者有利。
We analyze two insider-trading regulations recently introduced by the Securities and Exchange Commission: mandatory disclosure and "cooling-off period". The former requires insiders disclose trading plans at adoption, while the latter mandates a delay period before trading. These policies affect investors' trading profits, risk sharing, and hence their welfare. If the insider has sufficiently large hedging needs, in contrast to the conventional wisdom from "sunshine trading", disclosure reduces the welfare of all investors. In our calibration, a longer cooling-off period benefits speculators, and its implications for the insider and hedgers depend on whether the disclosure policy is already in place.