Bank Regulation/Supervision and Bank Auditing
研究发现，银行在监管和审计双重作用下，内部控制质量和财务报表可靠性显著高于非银行金融企业，且审计师对银行的审计投入更少。
We investigate how bank regulation and supervision influence banks’ internal control quality, banks’ financial statement reliability, and the effort expended by bank auditors. Using material weaknesses in internal controls disclosed under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as the proxy for internal control quality, we find that banks exhibit significantly higher internal control quality than comparable nonbank financial firms. Using restatements of financial statements as the proxy for financial statement reliability, we find that banks’ financial reports are more reliable than those of comparable nonbanks. Using audit fees as the proxy for audit effort, we find that auditors expend less effort in audits of banks than in audits of comparable nonbanks. Collectively, our findings suggest that the combination of bank audits and banking regulation/supervision significantly improves banks’ internal control quality and financial statement reliability, despite auditors expending less effort in bank audits compared to nonbanks.